ANTI-BRITISH BRAVADO BELONGS TO THE PAST
Today’s IRA Is Organized, Efficient And Very Strong on Security
San Diego Union-Tribune - October 1981
By Mary R. Duncan
A small bomb exploded and rattled the windows of my friend’s Belfast flat. The seven of us shrugged our shoulders, continued with our light banter and sipped our beer. As an afterthought, I commented that those damn bombs never go off when I have my tape recorder on.
The next afternoon while sleeping in my own flat, I was wakened by another bomb. Grumbling, I got up and joined my housemates in the kitchen. One of the young women looked startled and said, “A couple of guys came by for you, but we didn’t know you were here so they left.” Figuring that it was my young Provo friends, I walked back to the flats.
As I walked in the door, Sean, obviously disgusted, said to me, “Where were you at 3 p.m.?” “I was sleeping,” I replied. He looked at me and asked “Did you hear the bomb go off at 4 p.m.?” “Yes, it woke me up. So what else is new?” I retorted. Sean shrugged his shoulders and smirked, “Too bad. T’was for you and your tape recorder.”
These young Provos literally had blown up a deserted British army lookout post so I could record and include it with my other research materials.
This type of bravado occurred in 1974 and was their way of saying they liked me. It was, however, also a forewarning of their organizational problems and would probably not have occurred today because of their reorganization into a highly effective “cell” structure.
Prior to 1977, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was organized along traditional military models with brigades, battalions and companies. The battalions were formed along geographic boundaries, and most volunteers (members) knew what other battalions were doing and who was giving the orders. They openly fraternized with one another and frequented the PIRA drinking clubs. In fact, they would sing IRA songs and hold up one, two or three fingers, indicating which “Batt” they belonged to. It wasn’t difficult for a “tout” (informer) to compile a list of Provo members, thus making it easier for the “Brits” (British) to infiltrate or to arrest members of a “Batt” when it took credit for a bombing or “hit.”
Becoming a volunteer was also an easy process. You simply approached a know member and, after a cursory interview, were given some low-level assignments like running messages or “securing transport” (hijacking a car). You were sworn into the PIRA and as you proved your worth, you advanced in rank.
The classic terrorist cellular model is implemented when a group is having serious infiltration problems. A “cell” is composed of four or five people, of which one is the officer in command (O.C.) and another is the adjutant. The cell is autonomous, knows only what it is doing and may be disbanded after an operation is completed. It may not even know why it is doing a particular job or how it fits into the total picture. Thus, when a cell is broken by the Brits, the volunteers have very little information about the overall operation of the PIRA.
The PIRA has several different types of cells which are interdependent on one another. They are:
Internal Security, which is responsible for uncovering and interrogating “touts” and conducting inquiries about potential new volunteers.
Financial Affairs is in charge of fund-raising, legal and illegal. Bank robberies, slot machines, extortion and protection rackets are very lucrative. It is estimated by the British government reports that the PIRA nets $1 million each year through armed robberies.
Military Intelligence taps British Army telephone lines; charts the movements of army patrols, individual soldiers, Loyalist VIPs and other British officials. It singles out targets and relays the information to the Brigade Staff, which then assigns an Active Service Unit (ASU) to “hit” the target.
Security Units provide “safe houses” for volunteers “on the run”. Referred to as “resident” cells, they coordinate which back doors will be unlocked and research escape routes for present and future use.
Quartermaster Units secure and protect the “dumps” (storage for explosives and weapons). Distribution of and disposal of guns are part of their function, as well as acquiring false identification documents for domestic and foreign operations.
Training Units are highly specialized. Some specialize in “blowie gear” (explosives), while others teach the volunteers how to shoot a variety of weapons, surveillance tactics, how to handle themselves when “lifted” (arrested), plus a repertory of “hit and run” guerrilla tactics. Reliable sources maintain that some of these units are so immensely skilled that they have been flown to Lebanon and Libya to train their Arab counterparts. In exchange for this training, particularly in explosives, the PIRA has received guns and ammunition.
All of these units should be considered planning and administrative cells. The operations are carried out by the ASUs.
Active Service Units rob the banks, plant the bombs, assassinate “touts” and soldiers, secure “transport” and do whatever is assigned by the Brigade Staff.
ARMY COUNCIL
(7 people)
G.H.Q STAFF
(6-7 people, Dublin Based)
NORTHERN IRELAND COMMAND
(BELFAST BASED)
BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE
(DERRY-TYRONE) (S. ARMAGH) (S. DOWN) (MID-ULSTER)
(There are five Brigades. The internal cell structure of the Belfast Brigade is diagrammed. The cells are all independent of one another).
BELFAST BRIGADE
ASU INT. FIN MIL SEC Active Service Units SEC fund- INTEL safe houses hit squads, plant bombs “touts” raising spying
QM TRAINING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
“dumps”, “blowie gear” “muscle” for community weapons handles local disputes
Every organization has its pecking order. At the bottom of the PIRA is “Civ Admin” (Civil Administration). Civ Admin, the equivalent of a community police force, settles pub fights, deals with delinquent teenagers and is basically the “muscle”, not the “brains”, of the PIRA. Prospective members would first approach a volunteer in Civ Admin and, if approved by Internal Affairs, would be assigned to Civ Admin to see how they worked out. If they showed promise, they would be moved into a cell unit.
The cells receive orders from and report to the Brigade Staff. It reports to the Northern Ireland Command (NIC), which is responsible for day-to-day operations and coordinates all five brigades located in Northern Ireland. The Belfast Brigade is the most active and most important. The NIC also has a cadre of undercover specialists who do special assignments such as manufacturing bombs or securing arms. These undercover specialists are in addition to the regular cell units and answer only to the NIC.
The NIC is responsible to the General Headquarters Staff (GHQ), which is composed of seven people. GHQ insures that the units are supplied with arms, money, explosives and whatever else they need to function. It is based in Dublin, in the Irish Republic, rather than in Ulster, and takes its directions from the Provisional Army Council (PAC). PAC is also based in Dublin and is the policy-making body for the PIRA. PAC decides that it is policy to assassinate prominent British citizens such as the late Lord Louis Mountbatten (slain in August 1979). It is also their decision to call a cease-fire or to initiate a hunger strike.
Detractors of the PIRA assert that the initiation of the cell structure proves that the PIRA no longer has community support. The cellular model is one used by the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany. It is resorted to when you cannot rely on community support or when you are being penetrated by the opposition.
Penetration was a major problem for PIRA in 1976-77. Until then it was almost impossible to resign from PIRA, so going over to the Brits was one way out. And disgruntled volunteers, their friends and families knew a lot about Provo business which could, in turn, provide more information for the Brits.
But the Brits have admitted that the cellular reorganization is very effective. A report written by Brigadier James Glover (now a major general) in 1979, titled “Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends,” stated:
In 1977 PIRA adopted the classic terrorist cellular organization in response to their difficulties. . . The Provisionals cannot attract the large numbers of active terrorists they had in 1972-73. But they no longer need them. PIRA’s organization is now such that a small level number of activists can maintain a disportunate level of violence. . . They will probably continue to have the manpower they need to sustain violence during the next five years. . .”
The report reinforced reports of the renewed strength of the PIRA by disagreeing with British officials when it stressed that:
Our evidence. . . does not support the view that they are merely mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and the unemployable. PIRA now trains and uses its members with care. The Active Service Units are for the most part manned by terrorists tempered by up to ten years of operational experience.
Additionally, the report concluded that the PIRA is not just a handful of terrorists, but has about 500 full-time members who are armed and well-trained.
The reorganization has also dramatically improved the public relations efforts of the PIRA. It has become more sophisticated and the differences between 1975 and 1981 are obvious.
The offices of the Sinn Fein, the legal political party which is a known front of the PIRA, are still located on the Lower Falls Road, but in a nicer building. The iron-grilled door has a buzzer and intercom system, from which a voice asked me to identify myself. When I mentioned the names of two prominent families, a young man came downstairs to greet me.
The upstairs room had a television monitor which showed anyone approaching the downstairs door. Richard McAuley, the Sinn Fein spokesman, who once served a prison term for IRA membership, wore a tweed jacket, matching slacks, a sweater vest and tie. His hair was nicely styled and, frankly, he resembled a young professor or businessman. His young daughter, Bronagh, toddled about, waiting for her babysitter. Everyone was very courteous.
The atmosphere differed greatly from 1975, when the offices were guarded by two big men who looked like thugs from Al Capone’s gang. The staff then obviously had a “war” to conduct and couldn’t be bothered with journalists or researchers. A noisy teletype filled one dirty corner and a rude young man summarily dismissed all inquiries as a waste of his valuable time.
The PIRA’s organizational changes demonstrate how effective the new cell structure has been and their new awareness of the media. Sinn Fein now provides photographs for reporters and orchestrates the hunger strikers’ funerals so they will gain maximum press coverage. Press members are treated with respect and given prime viewing positions for the funeral processions.
The young Provos no longer set off bombs for me, but they serve tea, arrange appointments with the Sinn Fein public relations officer and assign volunteers to give tours of their newly painted political murals.
Everyone is so polite. I almost thought I was dealing with the Brits.